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Abstract 
We use China’s unique institutional environment as a basis to study the country’s enterprise overinvestment 
behavior. In recent years, China has seen a surge in enterprise investment due to the huge availability of 
investment funds leading to difficulties in governing listed firms in the country. We separately analyze the 
impact of government intervention, rule of law and financial development of various regions on the 
overinvestment behavior of the listed companies. The results show that government intervention is positively 
related to overinvestment of listed companies. However, rule of law and financial development are negatively 
related to overinvestment of listed companies. In addition, the results further show that improved institutional 
environment can restrict overinvestment in listed companies. Further research indicates that, compared to the 
rule of law and financial development, government intervention is a fundamental factor which influences 
overinvestment the most. The study’s results have implications, particularly for the regulators, as they provide 
useful and detailed information which can be used in the design of more appropriate and functional systems to 
govern listed companies and help in curbing the overinvestment problem. 
Keywords: Government intervention; rule of law; financial development; overinvestment, Emerging Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
Inefficient investment is a phenomenon which currently affects many countries, particularly emerging economies, 
and in China, this problem has become even more critical in recent years where the government is seen to prefer 
state-owned enterprises over private firms as a mode of ownership. Relative to the issue of insufficient 
investment, the public and scholars are more critical of the ongoing overinvestment issue, thus the government 
has taken steps to increase interventions through the introduction of new regulations aiming at affecting 
enterprises’ investment behavior (Chen et al. 2011). 
Scholars using various research basis, including, agency theory, information asymmetry theory and 
corporate governance theory, have obtained considerable research successes in studying this problem. Since 
China is currently in the economic transition period, measures such as using special fiscal decentralization and 
local officials’ appraisal systems have been adopted by local governments to prevent firms from engaging in 
undesirable investment activities in their respective regions. Also, differences in the level of law enforcement 
and financial development in the areas play an important role in determining the effectiveness of the constraining 
measures in place. 
Similarly, institutional factors, such as regulations, contracts and laws, just to mention a few, directly 
restraint the overinvestment behavior and provide a framework which largely reduces uncertainty in economic 
transactions as well as investment activities. In China, the rule of law lacks the needed effectiveness and 
predictability which are widely available in developed economies. The developed economies are characterized 
with well-established external governance mechanisms to oversee enterprises’ operations. Various studies such 
as Peng, Wang & Jiang (2008) support this view and suggest that the aforementioned weakness leads to the lack 
of or inefficient enforcement of the governing laws. 
This paper, from the perspective of institutional environment, attempts to shade some light on the 
effect of local governments’ intervention, rule of law and the regional difference in the level of financial 
development in China on the overinvestment behavior by listed companies. This paper enriches the research on 
overinvestment problem in the transitional economy country and expand on the “law and finance” literature, 
hoping to highlight the main causes of excessive investment in Chinese listed companies and contribute in 
finding possible remedies. The structure of this paper is as follows: the paper proceeds with the Literature review 
and Hypotheses development in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the Research design, giving an account of the 
variables and the models adopted.  And, Section 4 discusses Empirical results, while Section 5 Concludes and 
gives some policy recommendations. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Douglas Northrop’s theory of institutional changes points that institutional environment determines the basis of 
production, exchange and distribution of basic political, social and legal provisions, i.e., it provides framework 
within which human interaction takes place. It is the most important factor that affects economic development of 
countries (North, 1990). Due to the existence of transaction costs, the behaviors of enterprises are certainly 
linked to the institutions. A number of existing theoretical and empirical literature point that governments have 
the motivation and capacity to promote overinvestment. Governments in developing countries are often in 
pursuit of industrial and technological advancement, hence encourage firms to enter over-crowded capital-
intensive industries or industry segments which lack comparative advantage.  
A further analysis from the study Xia et al. (2005), finds that, in places where the extent of government 
intervention is low, the government rarely tends to pass social burden to such region’s listed companies. China 
Centre for Economic Research (CCER) – Peking University Macroeconomic Study Group (2004) points that, 
from the root-cause perspective, the essence of overinvestment and inefficient investment problem in China is 
the result of property rights constraints and political achievement-oriented view of regional governments. In 
addition, Shleifer & Vishny (1994) suggest that, government officials, following their political stance, would use 
their power to encourage enterprises to conduct inefficient investment.  
Also, from the political promotion incentive perspective, the study Zhou (2004) finds that regional 
government officials have a very strong incentive to promote rapid growth of the local economy, which may 
prompt the officials to excessively allocate the largely available resources into certain projects or industries, 
hence causing overinvestment problem. In countries around the world, government interventions prompt 
enterprises to create a more favorable political environment for the sake of smooth business operations. As the 
Chinese economy is still in transition, regular government interventions bring uncertainties to all businesses 
which causes enterprises to seek for a closer and strengthened political connection with the government. 
Therefore, in order to establish a good political relation, enterprises will respond positively to development plans 
set forth by the regional government’s officials and increase investment. This may eventually lead to the 
overinvestment phenomenon in the particular region. 
An increasing number of studies show that the rule of law is one of the important institutional factors 
which affect corporate investment decisions. The research “Law and Finance”, pioneered by La Porta et al. 
(1998) proposes that improvement in the level of rule of law can promote the development of financial markets 
and financial intermediaries, hence encouraging enterprises to increase investment. Moreover, a study Sun et al. 
(2005) suggests that, the enterprise’s irrational investment behavior may be a rational choice to adapt to the 
existing legal system, laws and policies, market conditions, and other objective circumstances.  Jensen (1993) 
points out that corporate managers tend to pursue for “manager imperialism” investment scale, where, the 
managers are able to gain massive profits through a greater control of the available resources, and the managers 
usually have a strong desire to engage in overinvestment activities. If the investment goes smoothly and the firm 
grows in size, the manager can secure government incentives and a higher salary. Due to the protection from 
local government administrative regulations and the absence of property rights, managers do not have to pay for 
their conducts in the event that investment projects fail or seriously under-achieve. This allows the managers to 
engage in overinvestment activities with less fear. 
In addition, financial development has a crucial impact on the enterprise’s investment behavior 
(Levine et al., 1998). Greenwood et al. (1990) suggests that financial development can improve investment 
efficiency, that, regions with higher levels of financial development tend to have less inefficient investments. 
García-Herrero et al. (2005) propose that, reduction in inefficient loans plays an important role in restraining 
enterprise overinvestment behavior. Since marketization of state-owned banks is more profound in regions with 
higher levels of financial development, the banks from these regions usually consider long-term loans, especially 
with the purpose of making profits rather than for political-motivated purposes. Moreover, a study Fang (2006) 
uses a modified Wurgler method and finds that, financial development level variable is positively related to 
industry investment response coefficient, meaning the more developed a financial market is, the higher 
investment allocation efficiency is.  
Therefore, from the above analysis, we propose the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of government intervention is positively related to the level of enterprise overinvestment.  
Hypothesis 2: The level of rule of law is negatively related to the level of enterprise overinvestment. And; 
Hypothesis 3: The level of financial development and enterprise overinvestment are negatively related.  
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
We use data of A-Share listed companies sampled from Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SHZSE) and Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHGSE) in the period 2003-2008, and to ensure the accuracy and objectiveness of our results, we set 
four (4) guiding points when selecting the sample, as follows: first of all, we exclude all companies listed under 
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Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Treatment (PT) for the whole study period as there exist substantial 
abnormalities in the financial situation of these companies. We exclude their data to avoid a possible effect on 
the study results; we also exclude listed financial companies, as there is a relative big difference in financial 
situation between listed financial and non-financial firms; in addition, we exclude from our sample all companies 
with incomplete data; and lastly, we discard outliers below 1% and above 99% for each variable. Following the 
above procedure, we obtain 4396 valid observations. 
The related data of listed companies are from China Center for Economic Research (CCER) databases 
and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) website. The institutional environment data for all regions 
are from Fan et al. (2006) -- (NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces – The 2006 Annual Report on 
Regional Market Development) which compiles marketization indices for various regions (including; 31 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities) in China.
1
 
 
3.2 Model and Variables Definitions 
We refer to Richardson (2006) in building our model for estimating the optimal level of enterprise investment 
expenditure. The normal estimation model of the level of enterprise capital investment is as follows: 
INVt = α0 + α1 Growtht-1+ α2 Levt-1 + α3 CFOt-1 +α4 ROAt-1+ α5 Sizet-1+ α6 INVt-1 +α7 Age + 
Σ Industry+Σ Year+ εt                                                                                             (1) 
Referring to Fazzari, et al. (1988), Richardson (2003) and other related studies, we argue that, when 
the value of actual enterprise investment expenditures divided by its optimal investment expenditures (CISI) is 
near to 1, then it is an optimal level of investment. When 0.2≤CISI≤2, it is a reasonable investment interval, and 
when CISI> 2, it indicates an existence of a relatively serious enterprise overinvestment, and the residuals at this 
point represent the extent of excessive investment. 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions of Model (1) 
Variable type Variable name Calculation 
Dependent 
variable 
New investments (INVt) 
(Annual increase in the value of fixed assets, construction in 
progress, and long-term investment in the year t)/ (Total Assets at 
the beginning of year t) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Growth (Growtht-1) main business revenue growth rate in the year (t-1) 
Asset-liability ratio (Levt-1) Asset-liability ratio at the end of year (t-1) 
cash flow from operating 
activities (CFOt-1) 
Operating cash flow at the end of year (t-1) / Total assets at the 
end of year (t-1) 
Profitability (ROAt-1) Return on Asset (ROA) for the year (t-1) 
Asset size (Sizet-1)  Natural logarithm of the  total assets at the end of year (t-1) 
Prior Investment (INVt-1) Calculation method is same as (INVt-1) 
Firm Age (Age) The number of years a firm has been listed 
Control 
Variables 
Industry (Industry) 
11 industry dummies are set in accordance to SFC’s Industry 
Classification Standard. 
Year (Year) 
To control annual macro-economic impact, 5 year dummies are 
set. 
Considering that agency cost is a main factor affecting the efficiency of investment, we refer to the 
studies Ang et al. (2002) and Richardson et al. (2006), and use free cash flow (FCF) and major shareholders fund 
occupancy (ORECPA) as control variables. Similarly, we add industry and year dummies to the model to control 
for the annual macroeconomic impact on the corporate investment decision in various industries. This study 
draws its basis from the existing literature and set up the following model to test the above hypotheses. 
 
OVER_INVt=β0+β1 Institutiont+β2 GovDt×Lawt+β3 GovDt×Fint+β4 FCFt+β5 ORECTAt +Σ Industry + Σ Year +ηt       
(2)                                                                                                            
 
  
                                                          
1  NERI INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces - 2006 Report: The report only lists indicators of the level of 
marketization development for 2005 and the previous years. In this paper, the related indicators for 2006-2008 are replaced 
by the data for 2005). 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions of Model (2) 
Variable type Variable name Definition 
dependent 
variable 
Over-investment 
(Over_INVt) 
excessive investment in Year t, equals: regression residual for 
CISI＞2 in the model 1 
Explanatory 
variables 
Institutional Environment 
variable (Institution) 
Includes: government intervention index, rule of law index, and 
marketization index. 
Government intervention 
Index (Gov) 
Contrarian indicator, the larger the value, the lower the degree 
of government intervention. 
Rule of Law Index (Law) 
Forward indicator : the higher the value, the higher the degree 
of the rule of law)  
Financial Development Index 
(Fin) 
Forward indicator : the higher the value, the higher the degree 
of financial industry marketization 
Government intervention 
dummy (GovD) 
When Gov<Median, GovD is assigned to 1; 0, otherwise. 
 
Free Cash Flow (FCFt)  
(operating cash flow in the yeart – depreciation – amortization – 
expected new investment)/( average total assets in the yeart) 
Major Shareholders Fund 
Occupancy (ORECTAt) 
other receivables at the end of  yeart)/ (total assets at the end of 
yeart) 
Control 
Variables 
Industry (Industry) 
11 industry dummies are set according to SFC’s industry 
classification standards. 
Year (Year) 
To control for macro-economic impact in the year, 5 year 
dummies are set 
 
4. Empirical results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics of variables 
Table 3 displays descriptive statistical features of the variables in model (2), in which, the mean of 
overinvestment is 0.1509 and the maximum value is as high as 0.6037, indicating the degree of overinvestment 
in some companies as very serious. The last three rows, respectively, list institutional environment variables for 
each region, including; government intervention index, rule of law index, and financial development index. The 
mean of government intervention is 8.5597, with maximum value of 10.63, while the minimum is only -1.14. 
Rule of law index has a mean of 6.2972, maximum value of 13.07, while the minimum value is only 5.23. 
Financial development index has a mean of 7.7, maximum value of 11.48, while the minimum value is only 0.73. 
From the above analysis, we can easily see that there exists a huge difference in institutional environment among 
various regions, and that the effect of institutional environment factors on firms differs from region to region. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Model (2) 
 Sample size Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Deviation 
Over_INVt 481 0.1509 0.1208 0.0006 0.6037 0.1214 
FCF 481 -0.0890 -0.0782 -0.4985 0.2009 0.1224 
ORECTA 481 0.0323 0.0186 0.0004 0.2008 0.0375 
Gov 481 8.5597 8.6200 -1.1400 10.6300 1.4995 
Law 481 6.2972 5.2300 1.4900 13.0700 3.1852 
Fin 481 7.7000 7.7000 0.7300 11.4800 2.2829 
4.1.2 Regional comparison of overinvestment 
Taking 2006 as a case, we use World Bank (2006) regional distribution method to report regional disparity in 
corporate overinvestment behavior. As it can be seen from Table 4, the 2006 Southeast marketization index has a 
mean of 9.61, the marketization index for Bohai economic rim (BER) has a mean of 7.9, Central region 
marketization index has a mean of 6.44, and Southwest China marketization index has a mean of 5.86. 
Northeastern region’s marketization index has a mean of 6.33, while the Northwest marketization index has a 
mean of 4.82. Specific analysis finds the Southeast marketization index as the highest. The proportion of the 
over-investing firms from the overall sample and the extent of overinvestment in the region stand at the lowest. 
The marketization index for northwest is the lowest, with the proportion of the over-investing firms and the 
extent of overinvestment in the region standing at the highest.  Other regions follow a similar pattern. In short, 
with the continuous improvement of institutional environment in China, a gradual downward trend is expected in 
both the proportion of the regional over-investing firms as well as the extent of overinvestment among listed 
companies in the regions. 
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Table 4: Regional Marketization Index and the Status of Overinvestment in the Listed Companies (2006) 
Region 
Rank 
* 
Marketizatio
n index 
The number of  
over-investing 
firms 
Total Sample 
size 
The ratio of 
overinvesting 
firms to the 
region’s total 
firm sample 
Over_INV 
Southeast region 1 9.61 35 248 14.11% 0.1045 
Bohai Economic 
Rim 
2 
7.90 14 99 14.14% 
0.1306 
Central region 3 6.44 13 88 14.77% 0.1841 
Southwest region 4 5.86 13 84 15.48% 0.1616 
Northeast 5 6.33 8 49 16.33% 0.1765 
Northwest 6 4.82 11 67 16.42% 0.2318 
4.1.3 The comparative analysis between institutional environment factors and overinvestment 
To investigate the impact of institutional environment on the enterprise’s investment behavior, we use the mean 
of regional government intervention index, rule of law index, and financial development index, then divide the 
sample into two groups, where, group 1 is composed of the sample below the mean and group 2 is composed of 
the sample above the mean, with values 1 and 2 assigned to the groups, respectively. 
Table 5 shows the effect of different levels of institutional environment factors on enterprise 
overinvestment. Panel A lists results of the comparative analysis between the extent of government intervention 
and overinvestment. The smaller government intervention index is, the more severe the level of intervention is. 
Data from the table show that listed companies in regions with high levels of government intervention have 
higher levels of overinvestment, and the mean difference between the groups is significant at the 0.01 level. 
At the same time, we can see that the extent of overinvestment in listed companies from the regions 
with low levels of rule of law is higher than the extent in the listed companies from the regions with high levels 
of rule of law. Also, listed companies from regions with low levels of financial development have higher levels 
of overinvestment than those from regions with higher levels of financial development. However, the 
significance of the impact the two factors, i.e., rule of law and financial development, in restraining 
overinvestment behavior in listed companies is low. This also suggests that improvement of external institutional 
environment can constrain overinvestment behavior, and in part, confirming the study’s hypotheses. 
 
Table 5: Institutional Environment Factors and Overinvestment 
Panel A: The degree of government intervention and overinvestment - comparative analysis      between the 
groups 
  Group1: Gov=1 Group2: Gov=2 Group1 VS Group2 
Mean Mean P Value 
Over_INVt 0.1694 0.1334 0.001*** 
Obs. 234 247 
 
Panel B: The level of rule of law and overinvestment - comparative analysis between the groups 
  Group1:Law=1 Group2:Law=2 Group1 VS Group2 
Mean Mean P Value 
Over_INVt 0.1556 0.1443 0.316 
Obs. 283 194 
 
Panel C: Financial development level and overinvestment - comparative analysis between the groups 
  Group1:Fin=1 Group2:Fin=2 Group1 VS Group2 
Mean Mean P Value 
Over_INVt 0.1565 0.1447 
0.288 
Obs. 255 226 
 Note: ***, **, and * show significance at; 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 6 lists Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient matrices of the variables in Model (2). The data show 
that rule of law, financial development and government intervention are negatively correlated to enterprise 
overinvestment, which provides a preliminary support to the study’s hypotheses. Government intervention is 
positively correlated to the rule of law and financial development, which suggests that, regions with strong 
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government intervention have relatively low levels of the rule of law and financial development. It is worth 
noting that, the pairwise correlation coefficients obtained from the three institutional environment factors are 
relatively large, exceeding 0.6. This suggests a possible existence of multicollinearity among the three 
institutional environment factors. Thus, to avoid the possibility of multicollinearity, we separately insert one 
institutional environment factor in the Model (2) for each time we regress. 
 
Table 6: Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the Variables 
N=481 Over_INVt FCF ORECTA Gov Law Fin 
Over_INVt 1.000 -0.092** -0.126*** -0.143*** -0.061 -0.095** 
FCF  -0.109** 1.000 -0.028 -0.032 0.131** 0.051 
ORECTA  -0.130*** 0.044 1.000 -0.116** -0.020 -0.084* 
Gov  -0.229*** 0.075 -0.114** 1.000 0.627*** 0.743*** 
Law  -0.118*** 0.155*** -0.034 0.724*** 1.000 0.771*** 
Fin -0.152*** 0.053 -0.096** 0.734*** 0.771*** 1.000 
Note: Values above the diagonal are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, and below the diagonal are the 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients; 
***, **, and * show significance at, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 7 lists test results of the three institutional environment variables which affect enterprise overinvestment. 
In the first three panels, each of the three institutional environment variables are separately tested in the model 
(2).  Panel 1 shows that, there is a significant negative correlation between government intervention and 
corporate overinvestment at a 0.01 significance level. This suggests that overinvestment phenomenon is more 
serious in regions with strong government intervention, that is, the level of government intervention is positively 
correlated to enterprise overinvestment. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1. Second column shows that 
there is a weak negative relation between rule of law (Law) and overinvestment (p=0.204), suggesting a lower 
occurrence of enterprise overinvestment in regions with higher levels of the rule of law. This result basically 
supports hypothesis 2. Third column shows that, at 0.05 significance level, financial development (Fin) and 
enterprises overinvestment are negatively correlated, suggesting a relatively low occurrence of enterprise 
overinvestment in regions with higher levels of the rule of law. This result also is consistent with the hypothesis 
3. 
On the fourth column in Table 7, we simultaneously run analysis of Law and the cross variable, 
GovD×Law in the model (2). The results show that the coefficient of Law remains negative and relatively less 
significant.  Also, the coefficient of the cross variable, GovD×Law, is positive at a 0.01 significance level. This 
indicates that the effect of improvement to the rule of law on curbing enterprise overinvestment is relatively 
weak in regions with strong government intervention. On the fifth column, we simultaneously run analysis of 
Fin and the cross variable, GovD×Fin in the model (2). The results show that Fin and overinvestment remain 
with a weak negative correlation, and at 0.1 significance level, the cross variable GovD×Fin（P=0.073）and 
enterprise overinvestment are positively correlated. This suggests that the effect of improvement to the level of 
financial development on constraining enterprise overinvestment is relatively weak in regions with strong 
government intervention. At the same time, it can also be seen that, rule of law and financial development can 
play a useful role in areas with low government intervention.  This further indicates that, compared to the rule of 
law and financial development, government intervention is the fundamental factor which affects enterprise 
overinvestment. 
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Results of Institutional Environment vs. Overinvestment 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(Constant) 0.285*** 0.209*** 0.237*** 0.182*** 0.217*** 
 (7.269) (8.401) (8.176) (6.744) (6.994) 
FCF  0.009 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.019 
 (0.183) (0.341) (0.277) (0.371) (0.411) 
ORECTA  -0.481*** -0.451*** -0.469*** -0.456*** -0.466*** 
 (-3.410) (-3.188) (-3.316) (-3.235) (-3.307) 
Gov  -0.011***     
 (-2.803)     
Law   -0.002  0.000  
  (-1.272)  (-0.198)  
Fin    -0.005**  -0.004 
   (-2.240)  (-1.593) 
GovD×Law    0.006***  
    (2.521)  
GovD×Fin     0.003* 
     (1.799) 
Industry   Control    Control Control Control Control 
Year   Control Control Control Control Control 
F 5.999*** 5.596*** 5.815*** 5.696*** 5.713*** 
Adj-R
2
 0.165 0.154 0.160 0.164 0.164 
Obs. 481 481 481 481 481 
Note: ***, **, * show significance at, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; values in the parentheses are the T 
values (two-tailed). 
Through the analysis, we found the sample to have certain clusters. There is a certain correlation 
between sample distribution and improvement in institutional environment, that is, there is a decreasing trend in 
the number of over-investing firms with an improvement in the institutional environment. To further investigate 
a possibility of the correlation between the sample distribution and enterprise overinvestment, we replace 
institutional environment variable with the region’s overinvestment sample N as independent variables. The 
regression results are as shown in Table 8. Sample size N and overinvestment are insignificant (p=0.752). It can 
be determined that the regional disparity of enterprise overinvestment is a result of institutional environment 
rather than the differences in the sample distribution. Therefore, the regression results on Table 7 are reliable. 
 
Table 8: Regression Results of the Number of Overinvesting Listed Companies N (used in place of institutional 
environment) vs. Overinvestment 
Variable Regression coefficient p-value 
(Constant) 0.189*** 0.000 
N 0.000 0.752 
FCF 0.012 0.292 
ORECTA  -0.444*** 0.002 
Industry Control Control 
Year Control Control 
F 5.498*** 0.000 
Adj-R
2
 0.151  
Obs. 481  
Note: ***, **, * show significance at, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4 Robustness Test 
One of the assumptions of the Richardson’s model is; the overall capital investment of a listed company is 
normal, i.e., no occurrence of systematic under-investment or overinvestment. Otherwise, measuring under-
investment or overinvestment using model (1) will likely be affected with a systematic bias. We divide residuals 
of model (1) equally into three groups according to size and exclude the middle group, then set the group with 
the largest residuals as a group with excessive investment and the group with the smallest residuals as a group 
with insufficient investment.
1
 The above method is also applied to the model (2) accordingly and regress. At the 
                                                          
1 Similar studies have shown that, using methods similar to the one above to measure corporate overinvestment is feasible. 
We introduce enterprise investment spending index, mainly to show that the use of other methods does not affect our 
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same time, we also use a direct check, where, residuals greater than 0 are regarded as overinvestment, which is a 
common measurement method, and regress model (2). We find no substantial difference between the above 
regression results and our main results. This further verifies the validity of the study’s empirical results.
1
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is based on China’s unique institutional environment and its transitional economy background. From 
the country’s unique institutional perspective rather than confined to just the corporate level factors, this paper 
seeks for the relationship between institutional environment factors and corporate overinvestment. The study 
uses data of Chinese firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2008 as a sample to 
analyze the impact of regional government intervention, financial development, and the rule of law in the 
country. Below is a summary of the results from the study’s theoretical analysis and empirical tests: 
• First, enterprise overinvestment is positively related to government intervention but it is negatively 
related to the rule of law and financial development. After running logistic regression analysis on 
institutional environment factors and overinvestment, we found that, in the regions with high level of 
government intervention, low level of the rule of law, and less developed financial industry, the 
problem of overinvestment in listed companies is more severe. 
• Also, further investigation shows that, compared to the rule of law and financial development, 
government intervention is the fundamental factor affecting enterprise overinvestment.  This study runs 
regression analysis by adding cross-variables with the original variables and finds that, in regions with 
strong government intervention, the rule of law and financial development cannot better constrain 
enterprise overinvestment. Thus, among the country’s institutional environment factors, government 
intervention has the most important effect on enterprise overinvestment. And, 
• Lastly, as there exists certain clusters in the sample, we replaced institutional environment variable with 
each region’s overinvestment sample, N, as independent variables and regress. The result at the end 
showed that regional differences in enterprise overinvestment is caused by the institutional environment 
rather than differences in the sample distribution. 
This paper gives an account of the overinvestment problem of listed companies in China and the firms’ 
governing tools, that is, institutional environment. Though we have fairly touched most related areas and 
analysed several angles, still there is more that can be offered to the literature. Thus, in future, we plan to further 
the study by enriching more institutional environment factors and incorporating them in the study so as to see 
whether the modified study design will affect our current results. Also, we plan to widen the study by conducting 
an international comparison with other emerging market economies with similar institutional settings. 
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Note 
The 2006 World Bank Survey Report (Governance, Investment Environment & Harmonious Society: 
Improvement in Competitiveness of China’s 120 Cities) divides China’s 30 provinces (excluding Tibet) into 6 
regions: Southeast (Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong); Bohai Rim (Shandong, Beijing, 
Tianjin and Hebei); Central region (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi); Northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
Liaoning) ; Southwest China (Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing and Hainan); Northwest 
Territories (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang). Tibet is not taken into 
account as in 2006 there was no overinvestment in listed companies. 
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